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anctions against Iran over its nuclear programme have steadily been tightened by the 
United Nations Security Council. A far-reaching round of complementary sanctions 
i mp o se d  re ce n tl y  on  Ir a n  b y  t he  U S  a n d the E U  i s  s ta r ti n g  to  h u r t  th e  c ou n t r y , i ts 
economy and its citizens. And yet, Iran’s leadership seems deaf to demands for international 
weapons inspectors to be allowed unhindered access to its nuclear enrichment facilities. 
Tehran’s participation and delaying tactics in the EU-led diplomatic process geared to that 
end provide the regime with the cover it needs to pursue its clandestine programme of 
enrichment. A new report issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) asserts 
that Iran has rapidly escalated its uranium enrichment capacity in recent months and has 
installed three-quarters of the nuclear centrifuges it needs to complete a site deep 
underground for the production of nuclear fuel.1  
Conversely, in a move criticising the US-led attempt to isolate and punish Iran with 
economic sanctions, Tehran has recently received support for its controversial nuclear 
programme in a declaration adopted by the 120-nation Non-Aligned Movement. The ‘Tehran 
Declaration’ not only emphasises Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy but acknowledges 
the right to ownership of a full nuclear fuel cycle, which means uranium enrichment. With a 
regime that is not likely to sway to international and domestic pressure, and in view of the 
shifting strategic landscape in the Middle East,2 the question is whether the twin-track 
approach of sanctions and diplomacy should be kept up, or whether it should make way for 
an alternative set of policies that could preserve the fragile stability in the wider Middle East 
and turn a vicious circle into a virtuous one.  
This paper argues that the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, Catherine Ashton, supported by the European External Action Service, is in a good 
position to offer a negotiated way out of this seemingly intractable situation. 
                                                      
1 See IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant 
provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran”, GOV/2012/37, 30 August 
2012. 
2 See also S. Blockmans, “Preparing for a Post-Assad Syria: What Role for the European Union?”, 
CEPS Commentary, 2 August 2012. 
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EU-Iran relations 
Relations between the EU and Iran have been strained for years. Nonetheless, the EU has 
always expressed the wish to gradually deepen its bilateral relations with the country, 
mainly for economic reasons. In 2011, the EU was Iran’s largest trading partner, importing 
€14.5 bn of goods from Iran, and exporting €11.3 bn.3 Ninety per cent of EU imports from 
Iran were oil and oil-related products. And yet, the EU has no contractual relations with Iran 
and, with the exception of some humanitarian assistance and limited aid for drugs control, 
there is no financial or technical cooperation either. A trade agreement was in place during 
the reign of the Shah (in fact, the 1963 agreement with Iran was the EEC’s first-ever 
negotiated agreement of a strictly commercial character), but it lapsed in 1977. The Islamic 
Revolution of 1979 spoiled relations with the EU until well into the 1990s. 
An EU-Iran dialogue was initiated in 1995. After the election of the reform-minded President 
Khatami in 1997 this was extended to new areas and became the ‘Comprehensive Dialogue’ 
in 1998. A dialogue meeting was held every six months in Troika format and allowed a wide-
ranging exchange of views on global issues (counter-terrorism, human rights and non-
proliferation); regional issues pertaining to Iraq, the Gulf, Central Asia, and the Middle East 
Peace Process, and areas of cooperation such as drugs, refugees, energy, trade and 
investment. In recognition of their shared interests in commercial and political cooperation, 
the Council adopted a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive trade and cooperation 
agreement and – inseparably linked therewith – a political dialogue and counter-terrorism 
agreement with Iran in 2002, with negotiations in both spheres starting later that year. In 
parallel, the EU launched a human rights dialogue with Iran; the first such dialogue to be 
established in accordance with the EU Guidelines on Human Rights dialogues. It was 
conducted until Iran declined to participate after 2004. For its part, the EU made deeper 
relations conditional upon progress by Iranian authorities in four areas: Iran’s attitude to the 
Middle East Peace Process, the human rights situation in Iran, Tehran’s support for terrorist 
movements and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including 
nuclear weapons. Revelations about Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities and Tehran’s refusal 
to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency led the EU to cease efforts to 
formalise closer relations altogether. At its September 2005 meeting, the IAEA’s board of 
governors found Iran to be in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, because of the 
“many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards 
Agreement”.4 Iran’s continued refusal to comply with its international obligations and 
cooperate fully with the IAEA triggered the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to 
adopt a raft of resolutions imposing sanctions against Iran, which was binding on all UN 
members. The EU fully implements these UNSC sanctions and has also adopted a number of 
complementary restrictive measures. 
Sanctions regimes 
At the global level, the current sanctions package is reflected in UNSC Resolutions 1696 
(2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010), 1984 (2011), and 
2049 (2012). UNSC sanctions against Iran in effect supplement the sanctions regime that the 
United States has enforced since 1987 (upgraded in 1996, 2010 and 2012). The UNSC 
resolutions require that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and 
                                                      
3 See DG Trade, “Iran: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World”, 21 March 2012, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113392.pdf. 
4 IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran –Resolution adopted on 24 September 2005”, doc. GOV/2005/77, 24 September 2005. BEYOND ENTRENCHMENT OVER IRAN: CAN THE EU OFFER A FRAMEWORK FOR REGIONAL SECURITY? | 3 
 
heavy water-related projects, and take steps to build confidence regarding the nature of its 
nuclear programme. The restrictive measures set out in resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) 
and 1803 (2008) are aimed at preventing Iran’s acquisition of nuclear and ballistic missile 
material; equipment and technology that can be used for military programmes. Even without 
the most recent restrictions, the sanctions encompass a broad range of measures (see Box 1). 
Box 1. Package of UNSC-imposed sanctions 
‐  Embargo on all items which could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy 
water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and ban on 
related technical or financial assistance; 
‐  Visa ban and assets freeze on persons and entities directly associated with Iran’s proliferation of 
sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems; 
‐  Prohibition to supply arms to Iran; 
‐  Ban on new grants, assistance or loans to Iran except for humanitarian and developmental 
purposes; 
‐  Ban on commercial activity involving uranium mining, production or use of nuclear materials 
and technology by Iran overseas; 
‐  Authorisation to states to intercept, seize and dispose of Iranian cargo covered under the 
embargo; 
‐  Prohibition on bunkering services to Iranian-owned or –contracted vessels; 
‐  Ban on new branches, subsidiaries of Iranian banks abroad; ban on new joint ventures with 
Iranian banks. 
Source: C. Portela, “Impact of Sanctions and Isolation Measures with North Korea, Burma/Myanmar, Iran and 
Zimbabwe as Case Studies”, European Parliament Study, DG for External Policies of the Union, Policy 
Department. 
The EU fully implements the UNSC sanctions in its own legislation and has also adopted a 
number of complementary, i.e. autonomous measures (see Box 2). 
Box 2. Package of sanctions autonomously adopted by the EU 
‐  Embargo on key equipment and technology for the oil and natural gas industries; that is, for 
exploration and production of oil and natural gas, refining and liquefaction of natural gas, and 
for the petrochemical industry in Iran.  
‐  Ban on financial and technical assistance for such transactions. This includes for instance 
geophysical survey equipment, drilling and production platforms for crude oil and natural gas, 
equipment for shipping terminals of liquefied gas, petrol pumps and storage tanks; 
‐  Ban on imports of crude oil and petroleum products from Iran. The prohibition concerns the 
import, purchase and transport of such products as well as related finance and the provision of 
third-party and environmental liability insurance for the transport of Iranian oil; 
‐  Ban on the provision of certain services to and of investment in the oil and natural gas industries 
(exploration and production of oil and gas, refining and liquefaction of natural gas) and in the 
Iranian petrochemical industry. This means no credits, loans, new investment in and joint 
ventures with such companies in Iran; 
‐  Export and import ban on dual-use goods and technology, for instance telecommunication 
systems and equipment; and information security systems and equipment; 
‐  Assets freeze of the Iranian central bank within the EU. 
Source: Factsheet “The European Union and Iran”, doc. 5555/3/12 REV 3 PRESSE 15, Brussels, 23 April 2012. 4 | STEVEN BLOCKMANS 
 
Together, the UNSC implementing and EU autonomous measures constitute the most far-
reaching sanctions package imposed by the EU to date. Yet, the system has not proved to be 
fail-safe. 
Closing the loopholes, increasing the pressure 
The circumvention of the multiple international sanctions regimes has been noted at several 
intervals, perhaps most authoritatively in a leaked report of an expert panel set up under 
UNSC Resolution 1737 (2006), which stated that “Iran’s circumvention of sanctions across all 
areas, in particular front companies, concealment methods in shipping, financial transactions 
and the transfer of conventional arms and related materiel is wilful and continuing.”5 In July 
2012, the US Department of the Treasury reported that it had identified several companies 
and banks acting as front organisations helping Iran to evade existing sanctions by moving 
and selling its oil on the international market. Washington has also accused Iran of seeking to 
evade sanctions on its oil exports by disguising its tanker fleet. 
In view of all these loopholes, it is difficult to say what the full impact of the existing 
sanctions regimes could be. However, even with the circumventions, there is no doubt that 
the aggregate effect is already considerable. The UNSC Sanctions Committee established 
pursuant to Resolution 1737 (2006) has in subsequent reports noted that Iran’s rial has 
sharply depreciated against the American dollar; that sanctions on the energy sector have 
compelled big international traders in refined petroleum products to stop dealing with Iran; 
and that Iranian commercial entities are increasingly cut off from international financial 
markets, making it ever more difficult to find ways to pay in US dollars or euros for the 
equipment they need. Evidence of a causal link between the sanctions and a decline in living 
standards of the Iranian population is harder to come by and is currently still largely 
anecdotal. 
Sanctions have not, however, had the effect of altering the total volume of trade and 
investment in Iran. Rather, they have produced a shift in the composition of Iran’s trading 
partners, away from European and towards Asian countries. While this trend was already 
visible in the period predating the imposition of UNSC sanctions, it has accelerated since. 
Over the past decade, Iran’s trade with China has largely replaced the declining share of 
trade with the European Union,6 even if Beijing has been diversifying its supplies (e.g. in oil, 
with heavy investment in Angola and Brazil). 
IAEA findings on Iranian activities relating to the development of military nuclear 
technology, reflected in a report from November 2011,7 have further exacerbated concerns 
over the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Against this background, and indeed the low 
levels of commitment from the Iranian side despite efforts by the High Representative of the 
EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on behalf of the so-called ‘E3+3’ (the EU, France, 
Germany, the UK + China, Russia and the US) aimed at resuming nuclear non-proliferation 
talks, the Council of the European Union extended its sanctions regime in January 2012, 
imposing an import ban on Iranian crude oil and freezing the assets of the Iranian central 
bank within the EU.  
                                                      
5 As reported by J. Vaccarello, “Iran sending banned weapons to Syria, U.N. report says”, CNN, 12 
May 2011. 
6 See figures reproduced in Portela, op. cit, at p.21. 
7 IAEA Board of Governors, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant 
provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran – Report by the Director 
General”, doc. GOV/2011/65, 8 November 2011. BEYOND ENTRENCHMENT OVER IRAN: CAN THE EU OFFER A FRAMEWORK FOR REGIONAL SECURITY? | 5 
 
Following a review of the measures, in June 2012 the Council of Ministers confirmed that 
they would remain as approved in January. Thus, two exemptions have ended, as scheduled, 
on 1 July 2012: contracts for importing Iranian oil that were concluded before 23 January had 
to be terminated by 1 July. From the same date, EU insurers were no longer allowed to 
provide third-party liability and environmental liability insurance for the transport of 
Iranian oil. In a similar move, on 12 July 2012 the US further tightened its sanctions on Iran, 
blacklisting several companies and individuals that it believes are contributing to efforts to 
acquire nuclear weapons. 
Recent media reports show that, whereas the current UN sanctions against Iran have had 
limited effect, EU and US sanctions are having a greater impact than expected because of 
unusual levels of international acquiescence. This is particularly helped by Western 
dominance of the world banking and insurance systems, making the targeting of Iranian oil 
transporters easier. The European Union’s oil embargo, in particular, is hurting Iran, as 
many states are diversifying away from Iranian oil. However, as a means of pressuring Iran 
to negotiate or make concessions, the West’s sanctions policies have yet to yield real results 
in the diplomatic arena. 
Negotiating a way out of entrenched positions 
Essentially, the EU and its partners are following a twin-track approach of sanctions and 
diplomacy. Tough sanctions are meant to inflict such economic pain as to coax Tehran to re-
enter into meaningful negotiations with the E3+3 and implement its international obligations 
and relevant UNSC resolutions in full cooperation with the IAEA. The E3+3 group wants 
Tehran to suspend the enrichment of uranium to a level of 20%, close down an underground 
enrichment facility near the city of Qom and export its stockpile of 20%-enriched uranium. 
The thinking among EU member states is also that heavy sanctions should help to stave off 
the threat of a pre-emptive strike by Israel on Iranian nuclear facilities, with all its imaginable 
consequences. A package of incentives, including technological support for a peaceful 
nuclear programme and the normalisation of economic relations, is part of the diplomatic 
offer made by the E3+3. But evidence shows that Tehran does not consider this package as 
incentive enough to relinquish its quest for a nuclear capability in a volatile region. Several 
rounds of high-level and more technical talks between the “contact group” and Iran have 
failed to produce that glimmer of hope that would lead anyone to believe a breakthrough 
could be reached. Without real incentives, there are no reasons for the country’s hard-line 
politicians to take part in any meaningful negotiations. 
Tehran rejects the whole philosophy of waging economic war against Iran as a kind of neo-
colonial, gunboat diplomacy. Iran demands that the West lift its sanctions, including the EU 
oil embargo and the US measures against its central bank, and recognise its “non-negotiable” 
right to enrich uranium. With officials from the E3+3 meeting several times over the summer 
with their Iranian counterparts to gauge prospects for an agreement, Iran’s Revolutionary 
Guards responded to the new EU and US sanctions with a series of drills to test ballistic 
missiles capable of hitting targets as far away as Israel. For its part, the Iranian parliament 
countered the sanctions by backing a bill calling for Iran to try to stop oil tankers from 
shipping crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz to countries that support sanctions against 
it. The Strait is an artery through which about 40% of the world’s seaborne crude (exported 
from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Iraq) sails and nearly all the gas 
exported from Qatar. Iranian threats to block the waterway have mounted in the past year as 
EU and US sanctions aimed at starving Tehran of funds for its nuclear programme have 
tightened. However, a heavy western naval presence in the Gulf and surrounding area (the 6 | STEVEN BLOCKMANS 
 
Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean) is a major impediment to any Iranian attempt to block 
the vital shipping route.  
This entrenchment of positions is not without hazard, clearly. As Rouzbeh Parsi has pointed 
out in a series of publications for the Institute of Security Studies (EUISS), the sanctions may, 
on the one hand, lead Tehran to interpret the situation as “an existential confrontation, 
something which would in turn confirm the view of hard-line elements in Iran that the 
country is encircled by enemies poised to attack”. 8 Such a chain of events could generate 
“the very outcome the sanctions are trying to prevent: a weaponisation of Iran’s nuclear 
programme”. On the other hand, the increasingly belligerent rhetoric in Washington and in 
Israel over Iran risks becoming “a self-fulfilling prophecy”. Despite the lack of progress, the 
EU is keeping the “dialogue of the deaf” alive, precisely because the alternative is such a 
slippery slope. 
In the true spirit of Winston Churchill, it is better to “jaw, jaw, jaw” than to wage “war, war, 
war”. But the status quo in the talks currently led by the EU is untenable, especially since the 
rumbling of war drums is gathering pace and the prospect of a regional armed conflict 
becomes more real. As pointed out in a RAND report published in 20119, the E3+3 should 
normalise diplomatic relations with Iran and offer it real incentives for cooperation in order 
to break the deadlock. This would allow for negotiations on the substance of the nuclear 
proliferation issue. Others have argued that Iran would thereby be rewarded for its 
clandestine activities by allowing it to use them as a bargaining chip to obtain concessions 
from the West, just like Tehran uses the sanctions imposed on it as an argument to crush 
domestic opposition groups as so-called agents of Western powers. To those commentators, 
a change of tactic should hinge on the minimum demand for some kind of internationally 
monitored civilian nuclear reprocessing programme for peaceful purposes, backed up by the 
threat that if Iran oversteps this bottom line, it will face military action. 
A call to the EEAS 
At this stage, the stakes are so high that the EU, in particular High Representative Catherine 
Ashton who, supported by the European External Action Service (EEAS), leads the 
international effort in the E3+3, should try to devise a way out of the impasse. The High 
Representative and the EEAS owe it to their constitutional vocations and the mandate 
entrusted upon them by the EU member states and international partners to seriously try 
and get a more constructive debate going. The handling of the Iranian nuclear issue, of 
which the first generation of post-Lisbon institutional actors has taken ownership, may well 
define its legacy, or at the very least inform the EEAS review process that is set to take place 
in 2013. Of course, the daunting nature of the task to cohere a wide and disparate set of 
adversaries and stakeholders around a central plan has to be recognised. But even if the 
chances of success are slim, the EU should be seen to be trying hard to take the heat out of 
the current deadlock. 
                                                      
8 See European Union Institute for Security Studies, “Iran: A revolutionary republic in transition”, 
Chaillot Papers, February 2012 (http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/cp128-
Iran_A_revolutionary_republic_in_transition.pdf). 
9  See “Coping with a Nuclearizing Iran”, RAND organisation report, 2011: 
(http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1154.pdf). 
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The first step in this direction would have to be the normalisation of diplomatic relations 
with Iran so as to allow all parties to the talks to enter into structural and constructive 
negotiations on substance. As Parsi has remarked, as long as Iran is the object of discussion 
and economic warfare rather than an equal participant in negotiations, the Iranian 
leadership’s primary incentive will be to act as a spoiler of the talks. The High 
Representative and the EEAS should therefore prepare the ground to redefine the objectives 
of the E3+3 negotiations and the terms under which these talks would have to be conducted 
in the future. In order to generate a genuine interest among all players involved, and indeed 
their agreement to redefine diplomatic negotiations, the new objectives of the talks ought to 
go beyond the weaponisation of Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran is only one piece of the 
wider puzzle, albeit a crucial one. The bigger challenge is to make Iran a part of the region 
instead of a threat to the region. What is currently lacking from the efforts of the 
international community to bring peace and stability to the region is an overall framework 
that gives all existing initiatives and attempts at peaceful dispute resolution in the Middle 
East a sense of purpose and direction. Given the changing strategic landscape and the zero-
sum security metrics in the region, the EU should propose a regional security framework 
which ties in all relevant actors, takes everyone’s security needs into account, and thus 
diminishes the mistrust that fuels proliferation. A realistic prospect of the negotiation and 
conclusion of a common security framework for the Middle East, which goes beyond the 
hitherto unsuccessful attempts to create a nuclear-free zone, would not only represent a real 
incentive for all actors to enter into substantial negotiations but also a huge step forward in 
geopolitical terms. As such, the Iranian nuclear issue could be tackled in a wider negotiated 
deal. 
Arguably, the EU is better placed to launch such an initiative than the US, Russia or China. 
Contrary to other global powers, the EU has maintained day-to-day exchanges with all 
countries in the region, including Iran, since the Islamic revolution. Apart from its leadership 
role in the E3+3 talks, the EU is currently steering the Quartet’s efforts in the Middle East 
Process. Furthermore, it has strategic relations with Turkey. For their part, the countries in 
the region will be interested in negotiations with the EU if the latter is backed up in its efforts 
by their major supporters, i.e. the US, Russia and China. Iran will be eager to see an end to 
sanctions, and may also be interested in assistance in economic and energy development and 
in re-establishing the historically strong trade links with Europe. In cooperation with 
security organisations like the IAEA, and under the auspices of the United Nations Security 
Council, the EU could inspire the countries in the region by engaging them in a process 
which uses the historical experience of the Union’s own creation to tie (former) adversaries 
into a regional security framework by way of a functionalist, bottom-up approach. 
For the EU, the process starts at home. For the initiative to be successful there must be an 
internal understanding of, and long-term commitment to, what the end goal is. It is up to the 
High Representative and the EEAS, in cooperation with the member states and other EU 
i n s ti tu ti o n s, to  d ra w  up  a p l an  tha t g oe s  be yo n d  th e  i dea  o f a n u c le ar -f ree  z one  f or  the  
Middle East and addresses regional security concerns in a comprehensive manner. 
I n c i de n ta ll y , s uc h  a  p la n  w o ul d  f i t w e l l  in t o  the  w or k  to r e va mp  t he  E ur op ea n S ec ur i ty 
Strategy. 